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Abstract
In this article the authors develop a new approach to the study of policy 
dynamics in a quasi-federal system of government. The goal is to contribute 
to previous research on comparative federalism by analyzing the variations 
of issue attention between levels of government and across four regional 
governments—Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country. To do 
so the authors follow the policy dynamics approach, developing a compara-
tive and empirical analysis about issue attention across time, territories, and 
policy subsystems. The analysis relies on an extensive database, created fol-
lowing the methodology of the Comparative Agendas Project, which includes 
all laws passed from the early 1980s to present. The results indicate that 
legislative agendas have become increasingly diverse since the 1990s, and this 
is partly explained by party preferences and the type of government.
Keywords
policy dynamics, comparative federalism, legislative agenda, party preferences, 
type of government
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The goal of this article is to develop a new approach to the study of policy 
dynamics in a quasi-federal system of government. More specifically, it 
explains law production at the national level and in four Comunidades 
Autónomas (CCAA)—Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, and Andalusia—
from the early 1980s to the present to, first, describe the variations in the lists 
of problems that are the objects of attention by the national and regional 
political elites and, second, explain why these variations occur. Hence, the 
goal is to explain not only which issues are monopolizing the legislative 
agenda but also to what extent institutional factors constrain the possibilities 
of action of regional policy makers, whether changes in political autonomy, 
such as the implementation of fiscal capacity of regional governments in 
1997, led to changes in the pattern of the prioritization of issues by regional 
governments, to what extent variations in issue attention are linked to the 
national legislative agenda, and whether partisan politics and the type of 
government—minority or majority—are related to changes in issue attention 
over time.
Research on comparative federalism and decentralization has paid atten-
tion to some of these questions (e.g., Erk, 2006). Most of the literature focuses 
on the impact of different institutional settings on economic performance—
fiscal federalism—or political representation—for example, the degree to 
which some units are overrepresented, the balance between national and 
regional interest in national institutions—giving a static picture about vertical 
distribution of authority (Wibbels, 2003). To provide a more dynamic perspec-
tive to the analysis of comparative federalism and decentralization, recent 
research gives more attention to party politics and policy preferences, follow-
ing in most cases Riker’s study of party causality (Aldrich, 1995; Filippov, 
Ordeshook, & Shvetsova, 2004; Wibbels, 2006). In this view, shifts in author-
ity are a reflection of the bargains made among national and regional actors, 
who have different incentives to pursue policies consistent with their priori-
ties. It is assumed that policy actors have strong preferences, political elites 
follow party ideologies, and thus differences in the governing political party 
or the pattern of interest representation will have an impact on policy dynamics, 
or even on the stability of the federation.
These analyses have increased our understanding of federalism, but they 
are mainly focused on the relationship between the national and regional gov-
ernments as a whole, leaving aside variation in the behavior of subnational 
governments (Wibbels, 2006, p. 182). This article seeks to contribute to pre-
vious research about comparative federalism by analyzing the variations in 
issue attention not only between the national and regional governments but 
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also across regional governments, over time, and across policy subsystems. 
To do so, we use the policy dynamics approach (Baumgartner et al., 2011).
Andalucía, Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country share important 
features. They became CCAA following a special route or fast track—the 
Basque Country and Catalonia in 1979 and Andalusia and Galicia in 1981—
assuming the maximum level of political jurisdiction and are granted special 
status by the Spanish Constitution in terms of language (the Basque, Gallego, 
and Catalan are recognized as official languages), civil code, and fiscal 
autonomy. All of them (except Andalusia) have a strong nationalist character, 
and each enjoyed considerable political autonomy during the Second Republic 
in the 1930s. In addition, these CCAA have experienced long periods of politi-
cal stability. As summarized in Table 1, for more than three decades the 
Basque Country and Catalonia have been governed by conservative regional 
parties: the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), always the minority for Basque 
Country, and Convergencia i Unió (CIU) for Catalonia (absolute majority 
from 1984 to 1995 and minority from 1995 to 2003). The same occurs for the 
case of Andalusia, governed by the socialists (PSA) for the whole period, and 
Galicia, governed by the conservative Partido Popular (PP), the majority for 
almost the whole period.
Our results indicate that legislative agendas were especially similar in the 
1980s, just after the transition to democracy. In this first decade of democracy, 
regional governments had to accomplish two crucial goals: the construction of 
their basic political institutions (regulation of public administration, electoral 
rules, etc.) and the development of the welfare state. Beginning in the 1990s, 
legislative agendas were increasingly diverse, and this is explained not only 
by institutional factors but also by party preferences and the type of govern-
ment. The results of the regression model illustrate that (a) regional legislative 
agendas are increasingly similar when the same political party (or under the 
same party federation) is governing in each CCAA, (b) the Spanish and 
regional agendas are increasingly similar when the Spanish executive is gov-
erning under minority and depends on the support of regional political parties 
for government formation,1 and (c) other factors like the transfer of political 
competences from the national to the regional level are important in explain-
ing the evolution of the level of regional political autonomy, but their impact 
on the increasing differentiation of regional legislative agendas is not 
significant.
The article is organized as follows. First, we explain the distribution of 
political competences and the level of political autonomy of regional govern-
ments in Spain, giving some information about the trends toward increasing 
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regionalization; second, we state some hypotheses that have as a main 
theoretical reference the policy dynamics approach; third, we define the data 
and methodological aspects of the article; fourth, we compare the evolution 
of the law agendas across time; finally, we discuss the importance of partisan 
politics and the type of government over issue attention and provide some 
concluding remarks.
Table 1. Type of Government and Governing Political Party, 1982-2009
Year Galicia Andalusia
Basque 
Country Catalonia Spain
1982 Partido 
Popular (PP) 
(conservative 
party)
PSOE Partido 
Nacionalista 
Vasco (PNV)
Convergència 
i Unió 
(CIU)
PSOE
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987 PSOE (socialist 
party)1988
1989
1990 PP
1991
1992
1993 PSOE
1994 PSOE
1995
1996 CIU PP
1997
1998
1999
2000 PP
2001
2002
2003
2004 PSOE PSC-ERC-IU PSOE
2005 PSOE
2006
2007
Minority governments are shaded.
 at BTCA Univ de Barcelona on July 15, 2011cps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Chaqués Bonafont and Palau Roqué 5
Increasing Regionalization
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 defines a quasi-federal system of political 
decentralization, which altered the fundamental pattern of politics in Spain 
after 40 years of dictatorship. This is a quite open and flexible system of 
political decentralization created during the democratic transition to prevent 
one of the most relevant political conflicts after Franco’s death (Linz & 
Stepan, 2006; Tezanos, Cotarelo, & de Blas, 1993). The question of how to 
accommodate the interests of the hard-liners who defend the unity of Spain 
and the political demands of those territories that historically had a strong 
political autonomy was a central debate that ended with the adoption of a 
hybrid system of territorial distribution of political power that shares most of 
the features of a federal state (Aguilera de Prat, 2001; Morata, 1992).
The implementation of this original system of political decentralization 
reflects the distribution of power in the Spanish society, and it is also an 
expression of the demands (especially of some communities such as the 
Basque and Catalan) for self-rule by some territorially based groups (Hooghe, 
Gary, & Schakel, 2010, p. 76). As a whole, 17 territories became CCAA 
from 1979 to 1985,2 but only 7 of them achieved the maximum degree of 
political autonomy in the early 1980s.3 In addition, the so-called historical 
CCAA—the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia—followed 
a special route to become CCAA and have additional political jurisdiction 
over issues such as language (Gallego, Basque and Catalan) and the civil 
code (Catalonia and the Basque Country) and have a special fiscal status (the 
Basque Country and also Navarra). These differences are recognized by the 
Constitution and each of the Estatutos de Autonomia and are explained 
mainly by cultural and historical factors (Aja, 2003; Capo, 2003; Requejo & 
Caminal, 2010).
In terms of self-rule (to what extent a regional government may exercise 
authority in its territory),4 (a) each of the 17 CCAA has a general purpose 
administration that is not subject to national government veto; (b) each has a 
directly elected assembly, which directly appoints the president of the CCAA, 
following a parliamentarian system of government quite similar to that of 
Spain; and (c) each exercises authority over a wide range of issues. According 
to the Spanish Constitution, the national government has a monopoly over 
regulation of defense, foreign policy, justice, criminal and commercial law, 
foreign trade, currency, citizenship, customs, and immigration, whereas each 
CCAA can claim jurisdiction over a list of issues defined in Article 149, 
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including social welfare, police, economic issues such as taxation, and cultural 
and educational policy (López Nieto, 2001; Porras, 2002).
Important differences exist on fiscal autonomy—this is the regional 
government’s capacity to determine its revenues unilaterally. The Basque 
Country and Navarre have a special economic system of Conciertos accord-
ing to which they are allowed to collect taxes, out of which they pay a 
“quota” to the national government for the performance of national-level 
government functions. They also have a larger capacity to set the base and 
rate of major taxes, whereas the rest of CCAA had competences to set only 
the base and rate of minor taxes until the mid-1990s. In 1997 a major tax 
reform was undertaken by the minority government of the PP, increasing the 
capacity of these 15 CCAA to set the rate of some of the major taxes (per-
sonal income and corporate taxes). This fiscal reform is an example of the 
permanent political tension about the pattern of allocation of power between 
the national government and some regional governments (mainly Catalonia 
and the Basque Country) that leads to an asymmetrical and open-ended sys-
tem of political decentralization.
In Spain, in contrast to most federal states, the distribution of political 
authority across issues may be revised and redefined according to bilateral 
negotiations between the national government and the governments of some 
CCAA (Linz & Stepan, 2006). One way to look at this process of devolution 
is to trace the evolution of decrees for the transfer of political competences 
(Decretos de Transferencia) from the national government to CCAA. As 
Figure 1 illustrates, there have been three main waves of political decentral-
ization. The first wave occurred in the early 1980s, as a formal response to 
the principles established in the Constitution, the Estatutos de Autonomía, 
and also some bilateral agreements made during this period (Aja, 2003).
The second wave occurred in the mid-1990s, as a result of a contradictory 
process of negotiation. On one hand, the two main national political parties, 
the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the PP, reached an agree-
ment to delegate political competences about welfare-related issues to the 
nonhistorical CCAA and thus to initiate a process to homogenize the level of 
issue jurisdiction at the regional level. On the other hand, the minority gov-
ernments of the PSOE (1993-1996) and the PP (1996-2000) reached bilateral 
agreements with some of the so-called historical CCAA, mainly Catalonia 
and to some extent the Basque country, oriented to increase their level of 
political autonomy over a larger range of issues, which contributed to increase 
the asymmetrical character of the Spanish quasi-federal state. Finally, a third 
wave has occurred from 2004 to the present, under the minority government 
of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and it is mostly oriented to adapt the 
Estatutos de Autonomía to new political, economic, and social conditions.
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This process of devolution illustrates the ability of regional governments to 
influence Spanish policy through an intense and politicized bargaining in 
which party preferences and the type of government play major roles. In 
formal terms the capacity of CCAA to codetermine decision making at the 
national level is quite limited (shared rule). They are represented in the upper 
chamber, but Comunidad-appointed senators are a too small minority—less 
than 20% of the Senado—without enough capacity to veto a national law.5 
Besides, there are no meetings between the national and regional governments 
through which binding decisions are made (Aja, 2003; Börzel, 2002). But, as 
we argue below, these limitations can be overcome when the Spanish govern-
ment is under minority and depends on the support of regional political par-
ties. Under these circumstances, some regional governments (mainly Catalonia 
and the Basque Country) increase their capacity to generate shifts in political 
authority and to modify the Spanish polity according to their priorities.
Explaining Issue Attention
The literature on comparative federalism has long been analyzing the role of 
institutions on decision-making processes (e.g., Erk, 2006; Hooghe et al., 2010; 
Wibbels, 2003, 2006). Some of these analyses focus on how different institu-
tional structures shape the incentives of decision makers operating in a multi-
level system of governance and/or how the national policy-making process 
0
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20
30
40
50
60
70
1978
Basque Country Catalonia Galicia Andalusia
2010200820062004200220001998199619941992199019881986198419821980
Figure 1. Transfer of political competences (decretos de transferencia) from the 
national government to four regional governments
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depends on the nature of representation in decentralized units. To a large extent, 
these analyses are focused on the formal rules of the game that regulate power 
relations across territories and ask to what extent these formal institutional 
arrangements of federalism constrain the pursuit of policy preferences by the 
different actors involved in the policy-making process. These formal rules con-
stitute a major source of stability and partly explain the obstacles that impede 
dramatic shifts in the distribution of authority among levels of government.
Formal rules regulating the structure of government in Spain—the Spanish 
Constitution and the Estatutos de Autonomía—impose important constraints 
on what regional policy makers can legislate. The asymmetric and open char-
acter of the Spanish quasi-federal state partly explains why the Basque 
Country and Navarra have more political autonomy than the rest of CCAA 
by controlling fiscal policy in their territory, why Catalonia and the Basque 
country have more jurisdiction over the civil code in contrast to other CCAA, 
and why attention to economic issues has increased since the late 1990s in 
some CCAA such as Catalonia, after the fiscal reform of 1997. But the formal 
distribution of authority does not give information about how much political 
attention a regional government is able or willing to exert on a particular 
issue. By analyzing formal institutional structures we cannot explain why 
some CCAA such as Catalonia and Andalusia have a leading role on the 
regulation of moral issues such as embryo research whereas others never deal 
with these issues, why Catalonia and Andalucía created an audiovisual coun-
cil in the mid-2000s in contrast to the rest of the regional governments, or 
why the law agenda in Catalonia became increasingly fragmented after the 
fiscal reform of 1997 in contrast to Andalusia.
Recent analyses of comparative federalism have sought to go beyond formal 
rules and constitutions following Riker’s study on party causality. Authors 
such as Aldrich (1995), Gordin (2006), Filippov et al. (2004), and Wibbels 
(2006) have introduced party preferences as a key explanatory variable to 
give a more dynamic explanation of the ability of regional and national gov-
ernments to generate shifts in political authority and/or to transform federal 
structures. But these studies on comparative federalism have not paid much 
attention to the impact of partisan shifts and elections on issue prioritization 
and policy outputs across territories, despite a large amount of research in 
comparative studies devoted to analyzing the connection between political 
parties and issue priorities (e.g., Schmidt, 1996). Authors such as Boix (2000) 
and Blais, Blake, and Dion (1993), for example, examine whether there is a 
greater propensity among political parties of the left to rely on government 
intervention and among parties of the right to rely on the market.
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From a different perspective, party mandate theory (Budge & Hofferbert, 
1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert, & Budge, 1994) suggests that political parties 
compete by giving more salience to those issues that are seen as more benefi-
cial for their electoral purposes. Some political parties are identified by the 
electorate as more competent to deal with some issues (and to give a more 
efficient policy solution); thus, political parties respond to the preferences 
of the electorate by giving more salience to the issues they “own” (Green-
Pedersen, 2006; Klingemann et al., 1994). It is assumed that political parties 
have strong preferences and party leaders will give especial importance to the 
values and the ideology of their own party, leaving for a second stage any 
other preferences like their own success as political leaders (Baumgartner, 
Brouard, & Grossman, 2009; Baumgartner et al., 2011). Accordingly, we 
should expect that differences in the governing political parties result in sig-
nificant differences in the issues that capture most of the attention in each 
CCAA. More precisely, we should expect increasing similarities across 
regional legislative agendas when the same political party (or enclosed in the 
same federation) is governing in each CCAA. By the same token, we should 
expect increasing similarities between the Spanish and regional legislative 
agendas when the same political party (or enclosed in the same federation) is 
governing at the national and regional levels.
The capacity of national and regional governments to prioritize some 
issues also depends on whether the executive has the majority of seats in the 
Parliament. When the governing party does not control a majority, it is forced 
to make compromises and to negotiate the legislative agenda with other polit-
ical forces (Hobolt & Klemmemsen, 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). This 
was the case from 1993 to 1996 when Felipe González (PSOE) governed a 
minority with the support of the Catalan conservative nationalist party (CIU); 
from 1996 to 2000 with José Maria Aznar leading a minority government 
with the support of CIU and the Basque conservative nationalist party (PNV); 
and also beginning in 2004 when José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (PSOE) gov-
erned with the support of the Catalan nationalist party of the left (ERC) and 
the far left (IU; see Table 2). During these periods, in which Spanish gov-
ernment formation depends on regional political parties, we expect to find 
increasing similarities between the Spanish and the Catalan or/and the Basque 
Country legislative agendas.
By the same token, we expect increasing similarities between the Spanish 
and regional legislative agendas when a regional government depends on the 
support of the political party governing at the national level. This was spe-
cially the case in Catalonia from 1995 to 2003 when the CIU had a minority 
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government with the support of the PP. Similarities across legislative agendas 
occur because minority governments are forced to negotiate and to introduce 
(or remove) some issues to the legislative agenda that directly respond to the 
priorities and ideological preferences of other political parties that are pivotal 
to the government formation. The introduction of fiscal reform by José María 
Aznar in the late 1990s, the exclusion of moral issues of the legislative agenda 
of the last government of Felipe Gonzalez, and the support of CIU of the Plan 
Hidrológico Nacional (National Hydrological Plan) introduced by the PP in 
the Spanish Parliament are some examples of these changes in issue prioritiza-
tion that, in most of the cases, imply abandoning some of the electoral prom-
ises of the governing political party.
Finally, the type of government is also a relevant institutional factor for 
explaining the capacity of regional political parties to generate shifts in politi-
cal authority. As discussed above, the Spanish Constitution defines an open-
ended system of distribution of political jurisdiction, which allows for 
permanent negotiation between the national and regional governments. Regional 
political parties play a key role in this process of negotiation, imposing some 
of their preferences when the Spanish government depends on their support. 
They are ideologically diverse but single minded in the sense that they 
converge in encompassing more regional authority and a greater share of 
resources for the regional government. CIU and PNV are on the economic 
Table 2. Spanish Governments, 1977-2008
Prime 
minister
Time in 
office
Duration 
in office 
(months)
Government 
party
Parliamentary 
seats (%)
External 
support
Majority 
or 
minority
Suárez I 7/77-4/79 22 UCD 47 No Minority
Suárez II 4/79-1/81 22 UCD 48 No Minority
Calvo Sotelo 2/81-10/82 21 UCD 48 No Minority
González I 12/82-6/86 43 POSE 58 No Majority
González II 7/86-10/89 40 PSOE 53 No Majority
González III 12/89-6/93 43 PSOE 50 No Majority
González IV 7/93-3/96 33 PSOE 45 Yes (CiU) Minority
Aznar I 5/96-1/00 45 PP 45 Yes (CiU, 
PNV, CC)
Minority
Aznar II 4/00-2/04 47 PP 52 No Majority
Zapatero I 4/04-2/08 47 PSOE 47 Yes (IU, 
ERC)
Minority
Zapatero II 4/08- — PSOE 48 Yes Minority
Source: Gunther and Montero (2009).
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right, whereas others such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) are 
on the left, but all agree on these demands for more autonomy (Hooghe et al., 
2010; Requejo & Caminal, 2010). We expect that the capacity of regional 
political parties to increase their level of political autonomy (measured by the 
transfers of competences) will increase when the national government is 
under minority leadership. We also expect that legislative agendas will be 
more fragmented as the national government delegates political authority 
over a larger range of issues to regional governments.
Data and Method
To analyze variations in issue attention across time and CCAA, in this article 
we focus on just one form of political activity, the production of laws. The 
so-called law agenda is defined as the set of issues on which statutes are 
enacted by the national and regional parliaments (Adler & Wilkerson, 2008; 
Brouard et al., 2009). Laws are a form of political attention shaped by con-
siderations that are both similar to and different from other forms of political 
attention (such as oral questions or speeches). We depart from the fact that 
different forms of issue attention serve different purposes and face different 
constraints—cognitive and institutional. The key advantage of using laws is 
that they are a direct measure of government activity—going beyond the 
analysis of statements—but laws are rarely used in the regulation of some 
issues—for example, foreign affairs. In this sense, we expect a study of laws 
to be informative but also limited in terms of capturing all of the different 
means by which political elites attend to different issues (Chaqués & Palau, 
2011; Chaqués, Palau, Muñoz, & Wilkerson, 2008).
The analysis relies on the databases created by the Spanish Policy 
Agendas Project (www.ub.edu/spanishpolicyagendas) following the meth-
odology of the Comparative Agendas Project (www.comparativeagendas 
.org; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Each law at 
the national and regional level has been coded according to a universal cod-
ing system based on 19 major topic categories (Table 3) and 247 subcatego-
ries. This coding system, first developed by Baumgartner and Jones in the 
United States, has been adapted to the characteristics of the Spanish political 
system, including some revisions to take into account elements that have no 
equivalent in the United States, such as questions dealing with the national 
health system or ETA6 terrorism.
As Table 3 illustrates the 19 topic categories have been merged into four 
main categories—economic issues, welfare issues, environmental issues, and 
basic state functions. The data include all the laws passed by the national and 
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regional parliaments. At the national level, the data set covers the period 
1977 to 2007, and at the regional level the data sets begin with the year the 
Estatutos de Autonomía were passed—from 1980 in the case of Catalonia 
and the Basque Country and from 1982 in the case of Andalusia and Galicia. 
Accordingly, most of the comparative analysis covers the period 1982 to 
2007. As a whole, the database from 1982 to 2007 includes a total of 2,911 
laws—1,511 passed at the national level, 526 in Catalonia, 299 in Galicia, 318 
in the Basque Country, and 257 in Andalusia.
Comparing Law Production
The analysis of law production in Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and the 
Basque Country indicates that regional policy makers are paying attention to 
similar issues with important variations across time. Regional law agendas 
are linked to each other, and this was especially the case in the 1980s. As 
Table 4 illustrates, when we consider all issues and the whole period (1982-
2007), correlations are significant and moderately similar across CCAA—
the mean correlation is .32. But correlations across the regional law agendas 
decrease gradually—the mean annual correlation between law regional agendas 
Table 3. Policy Agendas 19 Major Topic Codes
Economic issues  1. Macroeconomics
  4. Agriculture
  5. Labor
  8. Energy
 10. Transportation
 15. Commerce and industrial policy
 17. Science and technology
 18. Foreign trade
Welfare state issues  3. Health
  6. Education
 13. Social policy
 14. Housing
Environmental issues  7. Environment
 21. Public lands and water management
Basic state functions 12. Internal affairs and justice
  2. Civil rights
 16. Defense
 19. International affairs
 20. Government and public administration
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is .5 in the 1980s, whereas from 2003 it is less than .2 (always significant; 
Figure 2). This demonstrates that regional authorities are increasingly paying 
attention to different issues, and this trend is intensified in the new millennium.
The allocation of attention between the national and regional level follows 
a different pattern. Overall, the law agendas of each CCAA and the national 
government are moderately correlated—the mean correlation is about .36 for 
each CCAA as illustrated in Table 4—but some important differences exist 
across CCAA and over time. The law agendas of the Basque Country and 
Andalusia show a tendency toward less convergence with the national agenda, 
Table 4. Pearson Correlations Between the National and Regional Agendas 
(1980-2008)
Catalonia Basque Country Galicia Andalusia State
Catalonia 1 .247** .335** .364** .340**
Basque 
Country
.247** 1 .333** .301** .378**
Galicia .335** .333** 1 .343** .366**
Andalusia .364** .301** .343** 1 .379**
State .340** .378** .366** .379** 1
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
0.52
0.36
0.43
0.39
0.34
0.55
0.05
0.46 0.46
0.38
0.34
0.20
0.19
0.44
0.46
0.34
0.19
0.44
0.46
0.43
0.19
0.25
0.14
0.24
0.18
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Figure 2. Mean annual correlation between regional agendas (1983-2007)
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and this is especially the case after 1996, when the PP won the elections, 
whereas the opposite occurred in Catalonia and Galicia.
The analysis of percentages of attention by issue gives further information 
about these differences across time, across CCAA, and across levels of gov-
ernment (Table 5). First, most of the laws passed by both the national govern-
ment and the CCAA are related to economic issues. More than 50% of the 
laws passed by the Spanish Parliament are related to the economy, a percent-
age similar to that for the Basque Country (48%), which has a special fiscal 
regime, recognized in the Spanish Constitution. On the contrary, only 37% of 
the laws passed in Catalonia are related to the economy. Second, state-related 
issues capture an important share of the law agendas at the national and 
regional levels (about 30%), with important differences across issues. As far 
as jurisdiction is monopolized by the national government, none of the CCAA 
devotes attention to defense, and in the case of foreign affairs, there is only a 
marginal number of laws, most of them passed in the 1990s and related to 
foreign aid and cooperation policy.7 In the case of law and justice, important 
differences exist between the national and regional levels, with the exception 
of Catalonia, which devotes almost the same percentage of attention as the 
Spanish government (9.2% of the law agenda, almost double the rest of 
CCAA). The Catalan parliament passed 28 laws related to civil law (54% of 
the laws related to law and justice), mainly because the Spanish Constitution 
recognizes a special jurisdiction of Catalonia over this issue.
Third, Table 5 also illustrates that welfare issues are highly decentralized. 
Overall, each CCAA devotes about 23% of the law agenda to welfare-related 
issues, versus 9.7% of the national law agenda. Most of these laws are related 
to primary and secondary education and universities (about 10%), with some 
differences across CCAA. The number of laws about universities is higher in 
Catalonia and Andalusia compared to other CCAA (De Miguel, 2002), 
whereas attention to primary and secondary education is higher in the Basque 
country and mostly related to the ikastolas (the Basque primary and second-
ary schools). Finally, attention to health issues is especially important in 
Andalusia (5%), which has had a leading role in the regulation of biotechnol-
ogy since the late 1990s, whereas in Catalonia and the Basque Country, atten-
tion to health issues has decreased across time and captures only about 2.5% 
of the law agenda.8 Fourth, important differences exist in the regulation of 
environmental issues at the national and regional levels. Despite competences 
over environmental issues being highly decentralized, the national govern-
ment devotes more than 6% of the law agenda to these issues. Catalonia is the 
regional government that legislates more about the environment—more than 
10% of the laws passed in Catalonia are related to the environment—in 
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contrast to the Basque Country, which devotes only 3% of the legislative 
agenda to these issues.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that there are also important variations in issue 
attention across time. As expected, regulation of government affairs was par-
ticularly important during the 1980s. In this period, about 24.0% of the law 
agenda at the regional level and 14.2% at the national level was devoted to the 
regulation of basic political institutions, intergovernmental relations, the orga-
nization and financing of political parties and elections, and/or the functioning 
Table 5. Percentages of Attention by Policy Areas (% of laws passed per issue)
Galicia
Basque 
Country Andalusia Catalonia
National 
government
Economic, R&D, and  
 industrial policy
 
 Economy 15.8 24.2 19.3 12.2 17.7
 Agriculture 9.4 3.0 1.6 3.6 4.4
 Labor 1.7 3.0 2.0 1.4 6.1
 Energy 0.7 1.3 0.8 0.4 1.8
 Transport 2.0 3.7 2.8 4.3 5.8
 Industry 11.1 10.4 11.0 11.7 13.4
 Research and development 1.7 2.3 6.7 4.1 2.9
 Total 42.4 47.9 44.1 37.7 52.1
Welfare state  
 Health 3.7 2.3 5.5 2.2 2.7
 Education 9.1 9.7 11.4 9.7 4.5
 Social issues 4.7 5.0 3.9 5.2 1.1
 Housing 5.1 5.7 2.4 4.8 1.5
 Total 22.6 22.7 23.2 21.9 9.7
Environment  
 Public lands 2.4 1.3 3.9 3.6 4.0
 Environment 5.1 1.7 2.4 7.2 2.7
 Total 7.4 3.0 6.3 10.8 6.7
State basic functions  
 Rights 3.0 3.0 2.4 1.8 3.1
 Law and justice 4.4 3.0 3.5 9.2 10.0
 Foreign affairs 0.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 3.5
 Government 19.5 18.8 19.7 18.0 10.9
 Defense 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1
 Total 27.5 26.1 26.4 29.6 31.5
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of public administration. Attention to these issues decreased during the 1990s 
and increased again only during the new millennium in those CCAA that 
reformed their Estatutos de Autonomía (Catalonia in 2006 and Andalusia 
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Figure 3. Percentage of issue attention to governmental issues in four regional 
governments
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Figure 4. Percentage of issue attention to rights in four regional governments
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in 2007).9 The same occurs for the case of some welfare-related issues and 
especially for the case of education and culture. Most regulation in these issues 
was passed during the 1980s and early 1990s, when regional authorities defined 
the basic principles and institutions of the welfare state. On the contrary, as 
Figure 4 illustrates, most of the laws related to rights were enacted in the new 
millennium—the regulation of rights issues in the 1980s was 1.5% of the total 
law agenda and increased to 5.4% after 2000, and most of them are related to 
gender equality, patients’ rights, data protection, and accessibility policies. A 
detailed analysis of these laws shows how Andalusia and Catalonia are lead-
ing a process of policy change on right issues, especially those related to moral 
concerns.
In the case of the economy, the Basque Country has progressively devoted 
less attention to economic issues, contrary to the other CCAA, which increas-
ingly have given more attention to the regulation of economic and fiscal issues 
since the fiscal reform was put into practice in 1997. This is especially the case 
of Catalonia, which has taken the opportunities created by this fiscal reform to 
enlarge as much as possible its political autonomy. As an example, Catalonia 
is the only CCAA to have created (in 2007) an Agència Tributària (tax office) 
responsible for the management, liquidation, and inspection of national (trans-
ferred) and regional taxes. The increasing attention paid by regional authori-
ties to economic issues contrasts with the decreasing attention that the national 
government has paid to this issue: In the early 1990s the economy captured 
19.7% of the national agenda, whereas in the new millennium attention has 
declined to 14.9%. This is an example of the zero-sum power game that, 
according to Gunther and Montero (2009, p. 93), has characterized center–
periphery relations in Spain for years, with a fixed amount of political power 
within the state, so that if regional governments gain power, the national gov-
ernment necessarily loses the same amount.
The analysis of annual correlations and percentages of attention also 
illustrates that differences in issue attention across time and CCAA cannot 
be related simply to institutional factors and issue jurisdiction. The fact that 
Andalusia is devoting more attention to health related issues should be 
related to party preferences and the willingness of policy makers to respond 
to policy problems such as biotechnology and embryo-research techniques. 
By the same token, despite the fact that the Spanish government has jurisdic-
tion to develop the basic legislation on research and development activities, 
there is not a specific national authority (or audiovisual council) responsible 
for the regulation of the audiovisual policy (TV contents, publicity, licenses, 
etc.) until 2010. On the contrary, Andalusia and Catalonia devote a higher 
percentage of attention to R&D than Spain and the rest of CCAA, especially 
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from 2003, creating an independent authority—the audiovisual council—in 
the mid-2000s.
Important differences also exist across CCAA in the regulation of police. 
The creation of a regional police in the early 1980s is one of the priorities of 
the Basque Country and Catalonia. The possibility recognized by the Spanish 
Constitution to establish regional policies opened a policy window for 
regional intervention that was taken by these two CCAA to consolidate their 
special status. It was a way to reassert their strong self-government will and 
to create institutions completely differentiated from those established by the 
national government. For the case of the Basque Country the establishment 
of a regional police in 1982 was also related to the fight against ETA terrorism. 
On the contrary, this issue captured some of the attention of regional policy 
makers only in Galicia in the mid-2000s, whereas in Andalusia this issue was 
almost nonexistent.
Finally, as explained above, one of the main features of the Spanish quasi-
federal system is its flexible and open-ended character. There is a gradual 
process of increasing regionalization oriented to expand the range of issues 
under the jurisdiction of regional governments that in some cases deeply alter 
the level of political autonomy, such as the fiscal reform of 1997. Accordingly, 
one of the questions we ask is whether this process of increasing regionaliza-
tion has led to an increasing fragmentation of the legislative agenda of the 
Comunidades Autónomas. To do that we compute Herfindahl scores for each 
law agenda in each year. The Herfindahl is defined as the sum of the squared 
percentage of attention devoted to each issue. We use the normalized version 
of the Herfindahl index that ranges from theoretically perfect competition (0) 
to monopoly (1). An H score less than .1 is generally taken to indicate a lack 
of concentration, between .1 and .18 a moderate concentration, and greater 
than .18 a high concentration of the agenda. Figure 5 displays the results for 
different CCAA.
As Figure 5 illustrates, agenda fragmentation is always higher in Catalonia 
than the other CCAA, especially in relation to Galicia and Andalusia.10 In the 
case of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia there is also a moderate 
trend toward more fragmentation from the late 1980s to the present—in 
the case of Catalonia the average level of fragmentation in the 1980s was .14, 
whereas from 1997 to the present the level of fragmentation has declined to an 
average of .07. These results illustrate the willingness of these CCAA (with 
the exception of Andalusia) to increase their political autonomy and to make 
decisions by law about a wider range of issues; and these results give some 
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evidence regarding the impact of the fiscal reform in the 1990s over the frag-
mentation of the regional law agenda.
Summing up, issue attention across the law agendas in Catalonia, the Basque 
Country, Galicia, and Andalusia follows a similar pattern, and these similarities 
are especially important during the 1980s and for the case of governmental 
issues and education. But there are indeed important differences especially 
from the 1990s to present in relation to the economy, the police, the environ-
ment, research and development, and rights. These similarities and differences 
in issue attention cannot be explained simply by the formal distribution of 
political competences (or issue jurisdiction) between the national and regional 
governments. To explain the similarities and differences in the law agenda we 
should take into account other factors related to the political system, such as the 
type of government and changes in the party ideology of the government.
Type of Government, Partisan  
Politics, and Issue Attention
To test the effects of type of government, partisan politics, and changes on 
issue jurisdiction (transfer of competences) on the variability of law agendas 
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Figure 5. Fragmentation of the regional law agendas, 1982-2008
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across CCAA and between levels of government, we have developed three 
different models. The first model is aimed to test the variability of the regional 
and the Spanish law agendas and it is defined as follows (Equation 1):
 VRegNat = C + β
1
NatP + β
2
TGov + β
3
PCoin + ε	 (1)
where
VRegNat: variability between the regional and Spanish law agendas 
(measured using annual correlations);
NatP: party governing at the national level (PSOE = 0, PP = 1);
TGov: type of government (majority = 0, a regional party is pivotal 
in the formation of the national government, or a regional party 
depends on the support of a national party for the formation of the 
regional government = 1);
PCoin: the same political party is governing at the national and regional 
level (no party coincidence = 0, party coincidence = 1).
Table 6 summarizes the results of a generalized ordinary least squares 
regression for this model. The significant coefficients in Equation 1 illustrate 
that the Spanish and the regional law agendas are more similar when (a) the 
regional and Spanish governments depend on each other for the formation of 
government and (b) the same political party is governing at the national and 
regional levels. In the case of Catalonia, the annual correlation between 
agendas increases by .12 when the PSOE is governing in Madrid and the 
PSC is governing in Catalonia (2004-2007).11 During this period, the annual 
correlations of the Spanish and Catalan law agendas are high, reaching .7 in 
2004. An example of these similarities between the socialist agendas at both 
the national and regional levels is the regulation of the rights of the victims 
of the civil war and the dictatorship. In 2007 both the Spanish and Catalan 
parliaments passed a law related to this issue (Ley 52/2007 de la Memoria 
Histórica and Llei 13/2007 del Memorial Democràtic). This was done with 
the support of the other political parties, to be sure, but the PP never identi-
fied this issue as a priority, and the ERC did not give support to the Spanish 
law because it believed that the law should go further in the recognition of 
rights. Catalonia is the only regional government that regulates this issue, 
responding to the demands of most citizens, but also to the preferences of the 
political parties that formed the coalition government from 2003 to 2010 
(ERC and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds).
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Our results also indicate that the type of government has some impact on 
the pattern of similarities (or differences) of the law agendas across levels of 
government. The annual correlation between the Spanish and Catalan legisla-
tive agendas increases by .11 when CIU is pivotal in the formation of the 
national government (1993-2000) and when CIU depends on the support of 
the PP for the formation of government in Catalonia (1999-2003). It is during 
this period that the PP used its veto power to remove some issues from the 
Catalan law agenda, especially all demands related to increasing political 
autonomy. Once the government of CIU depended on the support of the PP, 
all issues related to the so-called Declaració de Barcelona disappeared from 
Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results: Variability Among Law 
Agendas
National and regional agendas 
(Equation 1)
Between regional 
agendas (Equation 2)
Catalonia–state
Basque 
Country–state
Catalonia–
Andalusia
Catalonia–
Basque 
Country
National party −0.78** −0.02 — —
Minority government 0.11** 0.18** — —
Party coincidencea 0.12** — 0.16** 0.19**
Transfer of competencesb — — −0.03** −0.01
Constant 0.32 0.31 0.45 0.19
Nc 375 375 375 375
R2 .07 .14 .16 .10
a. To analyze the variability between the law agendas of Catalonia and Andalusia, and Cata-
lonia and the Basque Country, the transfer of competences variable includes only transfer of 
competences to these CCAA.
b. In the case of the Basque Country the party coincidence variable was excluded from 
Equation 1 as in this CCAA the same political party has never governed at the national and 
regional level.
c. We cover 15 codes over a period of 25 years (1983-2007), which gives us N = 375 (15 × 25). 
We do not consider 1982 in the regression analysis to avoid including a third political party 
(UCD) that was governing until October 1982. We use a dummy variable (0, 1) to analyze dif-
ferences between the PSOE and PP, the two main political parties that have governed in Spain 
since the consolidation of democracy. We include 15 codes (Code 16 was dropped from the 
analysis since there are no laws on defense at the regional level, and Codes 7 and 21, and 15, 8, 
and 18 were merged since Codes 21, 8, and 18 have a very low percentage of attention at the 
regional level).
*Significant at .05. **Significant at .01.
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the agenda.12 By the same token, the minority government of CIU gave support 
to the budget laws introduced by the PP from 1996 in the Spanish Parliament 
and also to some of the most controversial laws introduced by José Maria 
Aznar, such as the law of the Plan Hidrològico Nacional (National Hydrological 
Plan) in 2001, aimed at redefining water policy in Spain against the prefer-
ences of most environmentalist groups and some regional governments.
The case of the Basque country corroborates these results. Annual correla-
tions between the Basque and the Spanish law agendas increase by .18 when 
the PNV is pivotal at the national level and when the PNV depends on the 
support of the socialist party (PSE) for the formation of government in the 
Basque Country. Once the PP got into power, the law agendas in Spain and 
the Basque Country became increasingly divergent—annual correlations 
decrease from .5 to .2—mainly because while the PP was giving special atten-
tion to labor issues and the reform of labor market, the PNV was giving prior-
ity to governmental affairs. Contrary to the case of Catalonia, from 1999 Juan 
José Ibarretxe prioritized those issues related to the transformation of the ter-
ritorial distribution of power in Spain to increase political autonomy and to 
open the path toward Basque self-determination. The Basque Parliament 
passed a set of new laws oriented to carry out important institutional reforms 
such as the reform of the Basque public administration and the electoral rules 
and the so-called Plan Ibarretxe, which defined a new model of political rela-
tions with Spain that was never put into practice.
Our second model tests to what extent the variability of the prioritization 
of issues across regional law agendas depends on partisan politics. We expect 
that when the same political party (or a political party with a similar ideology) 
is governing in different CCAA, law agendas will be more similar than when 
two different political parties are governing in each CCAA. Different politi-
cal parties have governed Andalusia, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and 
Galicia for almost the whole period—the PSOE has always been in power in 
Andalusia, the PNV in the Basque Country, CIU in Catalonia until 2003, and 
the conservative PP for almost the whole period in Galicia, with the excep-
tion of 3 years in the late 1980s. Accordingly, we have limited our analysis 
to test whether the law agendas in Catalonia and Andalusia are more similar 
when socialists are governing both CCAA (2004-2008) and whether the law 
agendas are more similar in Catalonia and the Basque country when conser-
vative nationalist parties are governing in both CCAA (1980-2003). The 
model is defined as follows (Equation 2):
 VReg = C + β
1
PCoin + β
2
TComp + ε (2)
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where
VReg: the variability between regional agendas (measured using 
annual correlations);
PCoin: a political party defending a similar ideology is governing at 
the regional level (0 = no ideological coincidence, 1 = ideological 
coincidence of political parties);
TComp: the percentage of competences transferred to regional authorities.
Again our results corroborate the initial hypothesis. As expected (see 
Table 6), regional law agendas are more similar when the socialists are gov-
erning in Catalonia (in coalition with ERC and ICV) and Andalusia—annual 
correlations between regional agendas increase by .16—and when nationalist 
parties (CIU and PNV) are governing in Catalonia and the Basque Country—
annual correlations increase by .19. From 2003 to 2009, Catalonia and 
Andalusia led a process of regulation of rights issues (especially gender 
related issues) and telecommunications policy. In 2004, both regional gov-
ernments passed a law aimed to regulate the goals, structure, and functions 
of the audiovisual council (different in each CCAA) which is responsible for 
the regulation of TV content, publicity, licenses, and other issues related to 
audiovisual and media policy.
In the case of the Basque Country and Catalonia, the annual correlations 
between agendas decrease from .3 to .1 once the PSC rose to power. Although 
the PNV gave priority to issues such as education and industrial policy, the 
PSC focused more on the regulation of economic issues, governmental affairs, 
and science and technology. Some of these differences are explained by the 
process of institutional reform defined by the new Estatut d’Autonomia de 
Catalunya passed in 2006 by the Spanish government. The goals of the reform 
of the Catalan Estatut are much more moderate than the Basque Country ini-
tiative (or Plan Ibarretxe introduced 5 years earlier) but generate important 
shifts in issue jurisdiction. Some of the laws passed during this period, such as 
the creation of the Agència Tributaria de Catalunya (Tax Agency), are related 
to the delegation of some aspects of fiscal policy, whereas others introduce 
some changes in the functioning of basic political institutions, such as the law 
of the Catalan vice president (or Conseller en Cap) or the law of incompatibili-
ties of public servants.
Finally, results of Equation 2 also illustrate that the process of transfer of 
competences is not statistically significant as an explanation of the variability 
among regional agendas. Indeed, we see no relationship (r = −.03) between 
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the agendas of Catalonia and Andalucía when the socialists are governing in 
both CCAA. This is, the similarities and/or differences across regional law 
agendas are not affected by the pattern of transfer of competences from the 
national level to regions. Moreover, the direction of this coefficient illustrates 
the fact that most of the transfer of issue jurisdiction occurs during the early 
1980s, when Catalonia and Andalusia were governed by CIU and the PSOE 
respectively under majority government. As explained above, delegation of 
issue jurisdiction from the Spanish government to CCAA is mostly concen-
trated in the early 1980s—in the Basque Country 70% of the issues were 
transferred between 1979 and 1987, in Galicia and Andalusia 51% and 53%, 
and in Catalonia 44%—when regional governments are devoting most of 
their attention to the construction of their basic political institutions and to the 
regulation of welfare (Figure 1). Once this first wave of delegation of politi-
cal authority is completed, the percentage of transfer of competences contin-
ues more slowly.
Another question is whether the type of government and partisan politics 
affects the process of delegation of political autonomy to regional authorities. 
Our next model is aimed to test whether regional authorities gain jurisdiction 
over a wider range of issues (measured by the transfers of competences) once 
they become a key element in the governability of Spain. To do that, we 
develop the following model (Equation 3):
 TComp = C + β
1
NatP + β
2
TGov + β
3
Inst + ε	 (3)
where
TCompet: percentage of competences transferred to regional authorities;
TGov: when a regional party is pivotal for the national government 
formation (0 = no pivot, 1 = pivot);
Inst: the foundation and institutionalization of the autonomic state, 
from 1978 to 1987, when according to the constitutional agreement, 
the institutions and competences under the Estatutos de Autonomía 
had to be developed.
The results summarized in Table 7 (Equation 3) illustrate one of the main 
characteristics of the Spanish political system, which is the lack of stability 
of the distribution of political jurisdiction between the national and regional 
levels. First, according to these results, the percentage of transfer of compe-
tences to CCAA keeps increasing, although more steadily during the 1990s 
when the national government is under minority. As described above, this is 
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the consequence of a dual pattern of negotiation: On one hand the main 
national political parties (PSOE and PP) started a process of homogenization 
of issue jurisdiction defined in the Pactos Autonómicos of 1992, which led 
to a process of rising delegation of political authority to all CCAA. On the 
other hand, Catalonia and the Basque Country opposed this process of 
homogenization, calling for jurisdictional reform to increase their political 
autonomy in the policy-making process, contributing to the asymmetric char-
acter of the Spanish quasi-federal state.
The results of Equation 3 also illustrate that all CCAA have benefited 
from the willingness and capacity of negotiation of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country to increase their political autonomy. This is, when the Spanish exec-
utive was governing under minority rule the transfer of competences increased 
not only in those CCAA in which regional political parties—CIU in Catalonia 
and PNV in the Basque Country—are pivotal in the formation of the national 
government but especially in those CCAA—Andalusia and Galicia—that did 
not directly participate in this process of negotiation. In the case of Catalonia 
the transfer of competencies increased by 1.64, in the case of the Basque 
Country by 1.67, in Galicia by 2.58, and in Andalusia by 1.71. Moreover, our 
results indicate that the national political party is significant in explaining the 
transfer of competences to regional authorities, but only for the cases of 
Andalusia and Galicia. In Andalusia the transfer of competences was higher 
when the socialists were governing at the national and regional levels; and in 
Galicia the transfer of competences increased when the PP was governing at 
both levels of government (by 1.95). By contrast, when the PP was governing 
Table 7. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results: Transfer of Competences to 
Regional Authorities
Transfer of competences (Equation 3)
Catalonia
Basque 
Country Andalusia Galicia
All four 
CCAA
National party −0.05 0.51 −1.66** 1.95** 0.18
Minority government 1.64** 1.67** 1.71** 2.58** 1.9**
Regional government 
creation
2.2** 6.22** 6.90** 7.09** 5.42**
Constant 1.43 −0.22 1.41 −1.94 0.78
N 375 375 375 375 375
R2 .31 .22 .46 .39 .59
*Significant at .05. **Significant at .01.
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in Spain and the socialists in Andalucía the transfer of competences decreased 
by 1.66, and the same occurred in the case of Galicia.
In sum, the capacity of regional governments to have an influence on the 
Spanish law agenda and to gain jurisdiction over a wider range of issues 
increases when the national government depends on their support. Under 
these circumstances regional political parties engage in an intense process of 
bilateral negotiations with the Spanish government aimed at increasing the 
range of issues under their jurisdiction. Our results illustrate that the willingness 
and capacity of negotiation of Catalonia and the Basque Country have bene-
fited not only these two CCAA but especially Andalusia and Galicia, which 
increase their degree of political autonomy without devoting much of their 
political resources to achieve this end.
Conclusion
In this article we have developed a comparative and empirical analysis about 
issue prioritization in a quasi-federal state using lens of the policy dynamics 
approach. By doing so, we contribute to the existing literature on comparative 
federalism and decentralization, moving beyond case studies and the analysis 
of vertical relations between levels of government. The development of large 
data sets about law production at the national and regional levels constitutes 
the point of departure for the study of how and why issue attention varies 
across time, across CCAA, and between levels of governments. By using this 
approach we increase our understanding about the dynamics of issue atten-
tion between levels of government but also across subnational governments, 
testing several hypotheses about the impact of institutions, party preferences, 
and type of government.
We have argued that, as expected, formal institutional arrangements that 
regulate power relations constitute a major source of stability and partly 
explain how shifts in political authority have occurred in the past decades. 
The asymmetric and open character of the Spanish quasi-federal state con-
strains the possibilities of action of the different actors involved in the policy-
making process, generates important shifts in political authority, and limits 
the capacity of the CCAA to prioritize some issues in the legislative agenda. 
In this context, each CCAA prioritizes different issues according to its prefer-
ences and its capacity to negotiate with the Spanish government, taking into 
account the institutional framework defined in the Constitution and the 
Estatutos de Autonomia.
Our results indicate that party preferences and the type of government are 
relevant factors in explaining the pattern of prioritization of issues of the 
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legislative agendas at both levels of government. The regression models indicate 
that law agendas are more similar when the same political party (or a party with 
a similar ideological character) is governing at the national and regional levels 
and/or when the same political party is governing in two different CCAA (such 
as Catalonia and Andalusia from 2003). Our results also illustrate that when 
regional and national governments depend on each other for the formation of 
government, laws agendas are increasingly similar. Finally, our model indicates 
that when regional political parties are pivotal in the formation of national gov-
ernments, regional governments gain jurisdiction over a wider range of issues, 
increasing their capacity to take decisions in their territories. This process of 
reallocation of authority benefits not only Catalonia and the Basque Country but 
also Andalusia and Galicia, which devote almost no political resources to con-
solidate this quasi-federal system of government called the Estado de las 
Autonomías. In this sense, this article gives further evidence of the fact that the 
willingness and the capacity of some regional governments, especially Catalonia 
and the Basque Country, to increase their political autonomy has benefited the 
rest of Comunidades Autónomas, and this is especially the case when the same 
political party is governing at the regional and national levels.
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Notes
 1. All regional socialist parties (PSC in Catalonia, the PSE in the Basque Country, 
and the PSA in Andalusia) are part of the same federation. They do not have a 
specific parliamentary group in the Spanish Parliament, forming a unitary ideo-
logical group.
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 2. A CCAA is defined as a (regional) government of a coherent territorial entity 
of a certain size situated between the local and national levels with capacity for 
authoritative decision making.
 3. The Spanish constitution also defines two ways to achieve the status of CCAA. 
The Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia, as historical nationali-
ties, were granted on a fast track and gained autonomy in 1980 (Catalonia and the 
Basque Country) and 1982 (Galicia and Andalusia). The rest of CCAA followed 
the slow route with the exception of Valencia, Navarra, and Canarias, which 
negotiated a special route to achieve more political autonomy over some issues, 
especially welfare issues.
 4. To define systematically the degree of political autonomy of regional governments 
in Spain we depart from the analysis of Hooghe, Gary, and Schakel (2010).
 5. The Senado has two different goals: One is political representation, and the other 
territorial representation. Accordingly, most of the seats of the senate are dis-
tributed across the Spanish provinces following a majoritarian system of election. 
Each province receives four seats (with the exception of the islands), and the 
remaining seats are divided among the CCAA and selected directly for the assem-
bly of each CCAA on the basis of one seat per million inhabitants with a minimum 
of one seat.
 6. ETA refers  to  Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty, Spanish 
terrorist group).
 7. Although there is a tendency toward increasing participation of CCAA in this 
issue, the national government has monopolized foreign relations, especially in 
relation to the EU and international organizations, which capture more than 70% 
of the laws passed about foreign affairs.
 8. In the case of Galicia, jurisdiction over health issues was not transferred from the 
national government until 1989.
 9. The Basque government introduced in 2001 a proposal to reform its Estatuto 
(Plan Ibarretxe), which was not passed in the Spanish Parliament, and in Galicia 
a proposal for reforming the Estatuto was first introduced in 2005.
10. For some years issue concentration is very high because they are election years 
and only a few laws are passed.
11. During this period the PSC is governing in coalition with the support of ERC 
and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV). Both political parties are also giving 
support to the government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero in Madrid.
12. The Declaració de Barcelona was signed in 1998 by the three main regional 
political parties (CIU in Catalonia, PNV in the Basque Country, and BNG in 
Galicia) aimed to transform the Spanish quasi-federal state into a confederation 
formed by three of the historical CCAA (Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque 
Country) and the rest of Spain.
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